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In recent years, the number of surveys of access to and 
use of financial services has multiplied, but little is known 
about whether the data generated are comparable across 
countries, or within the same country over time. This 
paper reports results from a randomized experiment in 
Ghana to test whether the identity of the respondent 
and the inclusion of product-specific cues in questions 
affect the reported rates of household usage of financial 
services. The analysis shows that rates of household usage 
are almost identical when the head reports on behalf 
of the household and when the rate is tabulated from a 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Team, and the Poverty and Inequality Team, Development Research 
Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand household access to financial services and improving 
survey methods. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors 
may be contacted at rcull@worldbank.org and kscott1@worldbank.org.  
full enumeration of household use. Randomly selected 
informants (i.e., non-heads of the household) provide 
a less complete summary of household use of financial 
services than the other two methods. The findings also 
show that for credit from formal institutions, informal 
sources of savings, and insurance, usage rates are higher 
when questions are asked about specific financial 
products rather than about the respondent’s dealings with 
types of financial institutions. In short, who is asked the 
questions and the form in which they are asked both 
matter.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
By now, the link between financial sector depth and economic growth has been 
well established.
1 Most studies in that line of research rely on aggregate measures of 
deposits in, and credit extended by, the formal financial system, predominantly through 
banks.
2 Because those measures, such as the ratio of credit extended to the private sector 
to GDP, do not provide information about the average size of a loan (or deposit), they 
provide an imperfect sense of the outreach of the financial sector. A highly concentrated 
banking sector, in which a small number of relatively wealthy depositors and borrowers 
were responsible for a large share of banking activity, could score comparatively well in 
terms of financial depth with limited breadth of outreach. 
There are reasons to be concerned about breadth of outreach of the financial 
sector, especially in developing countries. As laid out in Levine (2005) and World Bank 
(2007), informational asymmetries, transactions costs, and contract enforcement costs 
lead to market imperfections that disproportionately disadvantage the poor, who tend to 
lack collateral, credit histories, and connections. And, in fact, recent papers have 
established a link between financial sector development and poverty alleviation (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2007; Clarke, Xu, and Zou, 2006; Honohan 2004). These 
results are consistent with the notion that the efficiency of resource allocation and growth 
are negatively affected by credit constraints that make it difficult for small-scale 
entrepreneurs to finance potentially high return investments (Galor and Zeira, 1993). 
Also consistent are recent experiments that find large returns on random injections of 
                                                 
1 See Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine 2005; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000; Levine and Zervos 
1998; and Rajan and Zingales 1998. 
2 See Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2000 for an overview of measures of financial sector depth and 
their construction.   3
capital to small entrepreneurs in developing countries (de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff 
2008, McKenzie and Woodruff 2008). Were credit constraints to be relieved, it appears 
that many currently poor entrepreneurs could repay their loans. Exclusion of the poor 
thus constrains the entry of new firms and limits the Schumpeterian process of creative 
destruction (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria, 2007; Klapper, Laeven, and 
Rajan, 2006). 
Perhaps the major reason why financial sector breadth has gone under-studied is 
the difficulty in collecting data.
3 Whereas measures of financial depth can be derived 
from the balance sheets of financial institutions that already furnish this information to 
supervisors such as central banks, the same information is not readily available, and 
certainly not in a consistent form across countries, for financial sector breadth. Recent 
attempts to collect data on financial sector breadth have pushed beyond balance sheet 
information, using both demand- and supply-side approaches. 
On the supply side, measures of the outreach of the financial sector often focus on 
the number of accounts of providers of financial services. For example, Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) collect information on the aggregate number of deposit 
and loan accounts from bank regulators in 99 countries. They also collect information on 
the number of bank branches and ATMs in each country as a proxy for physical access to 
financial services, even among those who do not actually use them. A limitation of those 
data is that they are derived only from information about banks, which, while important 
or even dominant providers of financial services in many countries, are not the full story. 
Honohan (2008) therefore combines the commercial bank accounts from Beck et al. with 
accounts at microfinance institutions (from Christen, Jayadeva, and Rosenberg, 2004) 
                                                 
3 See World Bank (2007) for a discussion.   4
and at savings banks that are members of World Savings Bank Institute (from Peachey 
and Roe, 2006) to produce the most comprehensive, though admittedly still rough, 
accounts-based estimates of access to date. While this represents a step forward, the 
accounts-based approach provides little information about the account holders 
themselves, and thus about the nature of financial exclusion in a given country. 
  A more satisfying, but costlier, approach is to interview users and potential users 
of financial services. These demand-side efforts to measure outreach are based on 
surveys of individuals and households.  Broadly speaking, there are two approaches:  (1) 
stand-alone surveys that focus only on access to financial services, which tend to be 
relatively expensive but produce rich data sets and a detailed portrait of access, and (2) a 
small module of questions on financial usage and access that is embedded within a larger 
survey that is designed to cover another topic (e.g., surveys of household expenditures or 
labor market participation) or multiple topics (as in the Livings Standards Measurement 
Surveys (hereafter, ‘LSMS’)). The marginal cost of the modules is much lower than that 
of stand-alone surveys, but they yield data that are much less rich. 
  To date, neither approach has produced comparable financial usage data at regular 
intervals that could be used to monitor the situation in a given country over time, or to 
compare outreach across a large number of countries. Because the stand-alone surveys 
are costly, they tend not to be repeated at regular intervals, and when a stand-alone 
financial survey is eventually repeated, there is no guarantee that the sampling frame and 
questions will be the same as in the previous survey, or that the same organization will 
deploy the survey. Because the modules of financial questions are placed within a survey 
designed for a different purpose, they tend not to be given high priority, and   5
comparability of data across surveys occurs largely by chance. A recent summary of the 
financial information generated in the LSMS shows that only a handful of basic questions 
about accounts and loans are asked in most modules, and even those are often asked in 
different ways, making the validity of comparisons across surveys dubious (Gasparini, et 
al. 2004). 
  While the accounts-based and survey-based measures of usage of financial 
services are not substitutes for one another, recent research has shown that there is a 
robust statistical link between the two (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria 2007, 
Honohan 2008). That is, a regression model can be constructed from the more readily 
available accounts-based information that can be used to generate reasonably accurate 
estimates of the harder-to-collect survey based data. Still, the fit of those regressions is 
not perfect. For example, Honohan (2007) estimates that 16% of Ghanaians have an 
account, whereas the information derived from the surveys we describe below places that 
figure at 25%. At best, it would appear that the usage estimates derived from accounts-
based information could be used to monitor access between surveys of users.  
  Scaling up collection of data on usage of financial services to ensure accuracy and 
comparability across countries and over time would therefore require a survey-based 
approach. While there have been other stand-alone efforts to measure usage, the most 
advanced current one is that by the FinMark Trust, which has deployed its FinScope 
survey (www.finscope.co.za) in a number of developing countries, primarily in Africa.
4 
Finscope surveys are designed to provide nationally representative information on 
individuals’ use of financial services. The questions on usage are similar to those that 
might be found in a marketing study, including detailed inquiries about specific types of 
                                                 
4 The FinScope website lists ongoing or completed surveys for fourteen African countries and Pakistan.   6
financial products. These questions are also supplemented by others regarding the 
respondent’s attitudes towards financial institutions, risk, and coping strategies in times 
of economic hardship, among other issues.  
By contrast, the most comprehensive effort to use the modular approach to 
measure usage, the LSMS, tends to ask broad, generic questions about ‘credit’ or 
‘accounts’ or dealings with types of institutions such as banks. Another important 
difference between the FinScope and LSMS approaches is that the LSMS finance 
modules track household usage of financial services, whereas FinScope randomly selects 
individuals from the population to provide information only on their own use. 
  In light of these differences in approach, the purpose of this paper is to provide 
evidence from a randomized experiment that tests whether measured usage of financial 
services is similar when respondents are asked detailed product-based questions (the 
FinScope approach) as opposed to more generic, institution-based questions (the LSMS 
approach). To foreshadow our results, the two approaches yield similar estimates for 
basic products such as savings accounts with banks or other formal providers, but not for 
others such as insurance or credit provided by banks and other institutions.  
These comparisons are potentially important because the expense of stand-alone 
surveys makes it unlikely that they will be rolled out throughout the developing world 
any time soon. Our results provide guidance on the product- and institution-based 
questions that yield similar estimates of usage, and they suggest ways that generic, 
institutions-based questions used in finance modules could be modified to produce 
similar estimates of usage for products such as insurance and formal credit.   7
  Regarding household usage of financial services, an important consideration is 
whether the identity of the survey respondent affects the accuracy of the information 
received. The most comprehensive approach to measuring household usage is a full 
enumeration, in which each member of the household reports on personal use of financial 
services and individual responses are then aggregated to the household level. Other 
approaches use an informant to provide information on the usage of financial services by 
all members of the household, typically either the head of household or a randomly 
selected adult. Another part of our experiment, therefore, tests whether the household 
financial usage information provided by the household head or a randomly selected 
informant is as accurate as that provided by a full enumeration. Because a full 
enumeration is more time consuming than reliance on an informant, these results will 
provide an indication of the services for which informants can provide reliable, cost-
effective information.  
While our main objective is to offer information on how question format and the 
identity of the informant affect the accuracy of financial usage information and its 
comparability across countries and over time, we also hope to provide information on the 
sustainability of data gathering efforts by offering evidence on the time costs associated 
with different questionnaires. Reliance on an informant and the use of institution-based 
questions cuts down on survey costs, and so evidence on the reliability of those types of 
questionnaires could help shape future plans. Also, although the FinScope approach 
focuses on individual usage, the results regarding informants can also speak to the 
feasibility of including a short module on household use of financial services in those 
surveys. In this way, the FinScope surveys could be used as a cost-effective vehicle for   8
gathering data on household use of financial services that could be compared with that 
gathered in other countries via LSMS modules or other non- FinScope stand-alone 
surveys. 
  We should acknowledge at the outset that we do not focus on the distinction 
between access to and use of financial services in what follows. Access, the possibility to 
use financial services, and the actual use of financial services do not overlap perfectly, 
though both concepts are relevant to a discussion of financial sector outreach. Although 
our survey does have a series of questions on why respondents do not use financial 
services, and thus we do have information on voluntary exclusion from participation in 
the formal financial sector, we do not focus on that information in this paper. Rather, we 
conduct a methodological experiment about reported usage of financial services.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design of our 
experiment, while section 3 compares the characteristics of our sample with that of the 
full Ghana LSMS -- we re-visited only a subset of those households, though our sample 
was designed to be nationally representative.  We also compare sample characteristics 
across treatment groups. Section 4 reports usage rates across financial products for 
product- versus institution-based questions and household usage rates provided via full 
enumeration versus an informant. In section 5, we introduce regressions to test whether 
certain types of individuals and households are responsible for the under-reporting of 
access that we find for some questionnaire formats in section 4.  Section 6 offers 
concluding remarks.    9
2.  The Design of the Experiment  
Household surveys vary across multiple dimensions.  The decisions on content, 
respondent, interviewers, timing and the like are driven by a combination of data needs, 
cost considerations, assessments of each household member’s knowledge and willingness 
to respond and sampling strategies.  There are tradeoffs involved:  greater detail in 
questions may aid recall but this boost to data quality and comprehensiveness can be 
counteracted by respondent fatigue arising from interview length.  High field costs can be 
minimized by using proxy respondents but this may decrease data quality and, thus, may 
not actually represent cost savings at all.    To provide some insights into the tradeoffs 
involved in the area of collection financial data in household surveys, we developed an 
experiment to test whether reported use of financial services is affected by either the 
choice of respondent or the format in which questions on financial services are posed.    
Respondents selected to provide financial service use data in surveys are very 
often the head of household (however defined).  This person is asked to provide 
information on household use of loans and savings and, more rarely, insurance.  This is 
the way that Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys were typically 
carried out.  However, there are concerns that not all individual financial service use in 
the household is known to the head of household and thus, the data collected in this 
manner may understate overall use of services and, perhaps underestimate specific types 
of services or use by certain categories of household members.   Reviews of both savings 
and credit issues in LSMS surveys recommended the alternative method of using direct 
informants to collect savings and credit behavior (Kochar, 2000; Scott, 2000).  In this 
way, data are collected from all adults in the household about their own use.  Several   10
subsequent LSMS have addressed several of these issues (Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001, 
Panama 2003 and 2008 for example
5). 
It may be, as is the case in the FINMARK surveys, that a third option for 
respondent selection arises.  In these surveys, a random adult is selected to be 
interviewed.  This is a strategy to ensure that the pool of respondents is a probability 
sample of all adults in the country:  a sample of household heads would be inappropriate 
for this purpose.  Although FINMARK surveys do not presently collect household 
financial service data, if there were an interest in doing so, logistically it would be easiest 
to have the randomly selected adult--already being interviewed-- provide financial data 
for the household.  Of concern would be whether this strategy would provide data of 
similar quality to that garnered from full enumeration of adults or even selecting the head 
of household to provide the information.  It is not clear, a priori, that every individual in 
the household will be equally well informed about other members’ involvement with the 
financial sector.   
A second key dimension on which surveys vary is the way in which questions are 
asked.   For ease of implementation, lower costs, and low respondent burden, a short set 
of questions that aggregate individual items into more global questions is preferred.  
However, research in other areas has shown that such questions may lead to accidental 
omissions or memory lapses, thus lowering reported incidence or use.   Experiments in 
measuring household consumption have shown that including a greater number of items 
in the questionnaire leads to higher reported consumption (Joliffe, 2001; Pradhan, 2001; 
Steele, 1998 and STATIN, 1994).  As importantly, in consumption measurement at least, 
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aggregation affects certain types of consumption more than others and can lead to re-
ranking of households on overall consumption (Joliffe, 2001).    
For financial service use questions, the most disaggregated level would be to ask 
respondents about each and every service available, from ATM cards to health insurance, 
to informal saving associations to formal bank loans.  This is the approach taken in the 
FINMARK surveys.  Such an approach should prevent accidental omission of service 
use.  It does, however, increase the burden of the interview which can lead to lower data 
quality.  It also may preclude other surveys from addressing financial service use as there 
simply is not ‘space’ in the interview for so many questions.     
The opposite approach, more similar to that taken by LSMS surveys, is to ask 
about financial service use at an aggregate level with a focus more on relationships with 
types of financial service providers than the specific products used.  Clearly this approach 
is simpler and less expensive to implement.  The concern is whether, as with 
consumption, certain types of items might be omitted.  This may be of particular concern 
in terms of financial services given the heterogeneity of knowledge of financial 
instruments in the population.  If there is more room for misunderstanding among 
respondents, it may lead to greater under-reporting.   
The experiment carried out in Ghana explicitly tests the effect on reported 
financial service use of changing the respondent and changing the set of questions asked.  
In order to develop and implement the experiment, we worked with the national statistical 
office of Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS)).  The GSS carries out a series of 
national household surveys and other statistical activities.  The most comprehensive of 
household surveys, the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS), is an LSMS survey   12
designed to provide information on multiple aspects of living conditions: human capital, 
productive activities, consumption,  and access to and use of public services, inter alia.  
The survey uses a national probability sample of households stratified by region and 
urban/rural areas developed to present results at the level of the three ecological zones of 
the country (GSS, 2006).  The survey has been implemented five times in the country 
since the 1980s with the most recent one carried out in 2005-06.   
This last GLSS5 presented us with a significant opportunity.  Research 
experiments are usually constrained by how much information can be collected in one 
questionnaire. However, by re-visiting a sub-sample of the GLSS5 households, we were 
able to take advantage of the information already collected.  This freed many constraints 
on the experiment survey.  More data could be collected on financial issues in the 
Financial Service Survey (FSS) as questionnaire space was not needed for gathering data 
on other characteristics of the household or individuals.  Additionally, a more complex 
design was possible as interviewers only needed to be trained on financial questions and 
data collection.  And, more risks could be taken as the government’s national survey was 
in no way at risk from the work: the GLSS5 is not a panel survey so any effect of the FSS 
on households’ willingness to respond to future surveys or specific answers to questions 
would not be affected by the experimental work.   
The original framework for the experiment was a three by two matrix, three types 
of respondents (head, randomly selected adult and full enumeration) and two types of 
questionnaires (product-based and institution-based).  Designing a survey that would 
allow all of the potential comparisons and that would isolate the different effects 
stemming from changing respondents and questionnaire types proved to be too complex   13
if we wished to ensure quality in the fieldwork.  A simplified, and more feasible, design 
was drawn up that still allows us to make basic comparisons.  These comparisons focus 
on two issues.  The first is the quality of household usage information provided by 
informants versus a full enumeration.  The second issue is data quality obtained using a 
product-based questionnaire versus an institution-based one.   
Physically, three different questionnaires were fielded with the second and third 
questionnaires containing more than one treatment (see Table 1).  Once the sample design 
was complete, households were randomly assigned to one of three groups.  Each of these 
groups of households were administered a different questionnaire.  This selection was 
made by GSS staff in headquarters.  In households where one of the treatments was for a 
randomly selected adult to be interviewed, interviewers used Kish tables to make that 
selection in the field.  Only individuals aged 15 or older were included in the full 
enumeration or were selected as random respondents.   
The GLSS5 households included in the FSS were taken from the two interviewing 
cycles of the GLSS5 closest in time to the fielding of the experiment.  This was done to 
minimize the chances that a household might have changed significantly between the 
time of the GLSS5 and the FSS: we rely on the GLSS5 data for non-financial household 
and individual information.   The selected enumeration areas (and households) were 
distributed throughout the country (see Table 2).   
The questionnaires were developed in close collaboration with the GSS.  In 
addition to their own experiences in other surveys, the GSS called upon various experts 
and sources in the country to determine the comprehensive list of financial services that 
existed and the range of service providers.  The GSS staff also worked to determine the   14
best terminology and how to minimize translation problems.  Training materials and the 
training of interviewers was done by the GSS.   The instruments were piloted and revised 
and the actual survey took place from October –December 2006. 
3.  A Description of the Data 
The financial experiment is the most useful if its results can be extrapolated to the 
entire population and not just those households included in the survey.   Every effort was 
made to ensure that this would be the case.  The GLSS 5 is based on a probability sample 
and we used a randomly selected sub-sample of these households which should be 
adequate.  However, since the FSS is, essentially a panel, it is important to determine 
whether or not there is panel attrition of significance.  And, given that in the final stage, 
households were randomly assigned to one of three groups with each being administered 
a different questionnaire (and treatments), there is also potential for problems to have 
arisen.   In principal we expect the basic characteristics of households in the FSS to 
match those in the GLSS 5 and for there to be no significant differences among the three 
groups of households administered the different FSS questionnaires.   This section 
reviews the resulting data to identify issues that arose in the practice of the survey’s 
implementation.  
As shown in column 1 of Table 3, more households in Ghana as a whole live in 
rural areas than urban, and over 65 percent of households have members working in 
agriculture.  Less than one-fifth of households have members working as employees of 
firms.   The population is young with the average age being only 20.  
Household size is slightly more than 4 persons.  Surprisingly perhaps, given the 
large agrarian base and rural population, most households are composed of nuclear   15
families.  Heads of households are female in slightly more than one-quarter of all 
households and while only 48 percent of household heads are literate, more than 60 
percent are numerate.    
Column (2) of the table shows the characteristic of the FSS households.  The final 
column shows the t-statistic and p value for the test of comparison of means of the two 
samples.
6  Note that for variables related to location, the FSS sample seems to deviate 
from that of the GLSS by being more rural, having more households engaged in 
agriculture and being more likely to be located in the Coastal and Forest Zones of the 
country.   We hypothesize that this resulted from using simple random sampling of 
enumeration areas for the FSS.  This fails to take into account the greater population 
found in urban enumeration areas that was captured in the original probability 
proportional to size sample.  Fortunately, the effects are not strong, but it should be 
remembered that the sample here somewhat over-represents the rural population. 
Between the time that households were interviewed for the GLSS 5 and when re-
interviews of these households were attempted for the FSS, some households had moved 
or dissolved and could not be re-interviewed.  Others chose not to respond.  Of the 2291 
households re-visited, a total of 335 could not be re-interviewed.
7  If attrition between the 
two interviews is randomly distributed there is no effect on the experiment other than 
cost.  However, systematic differences that might exist between the households that could 
and could not be re-interviewed could be problematic.  
                                                 
6 Due to revisions to the PSU codes in the GLSS 5 after the final FSS data set was produced it was not 
possible to use the GLSS5 sampling weights in the analysis. 
7 Fifty percent of the non-response was due to vacant dwellings (either permanent or temporary) and 40 
percent because the household had moved.  Actual refusals represented less than 3 percent of all non-
response.   16
To explore this issue we ran a probit model where the dependent variable takes on 
the value of one if the household was not re-interviewed and zero otherwise.  The results 
are shown in Table 4.  We find that, as one might expect, rural households were less 
likely to be lost between rounds.  In all likelihood this reflects the lower mobility of rural 
households compared to their urban counterparts.  Additionally, households with younger 
heads are more likely to have not been re-interviewed.  Again, these may be more mobile 
households.  Finally, households with heads working at the time of the GLSS 5 were 
slightly more likely to be re-interviewed.  One can perhaps, speculate that this job status 
lent some stability to the household or decreased mobility.   In sum, there is some 
evidence that the actual sample of households in the FSS under-represents more mobile 
households although the effect is not large.  This small tendency for urban households to 
not be re-interviewed reinforces the slight bias towards rural households that arose from 
the original selection of enumeration areas for the FSS.  This needs to be kept in mind 
when drawing conclusions from the data.   
Finally we look at the results of the allocation of households to the different 
questionnaire groups.  Comparing the means of key variables across the three groups 
(Table 5) is reassuring on this point.  The only area of concern might be that Group 2 has 
a slightly smaller household size than the other two groups, on the order of .25 people 
less per households.  While the difference is statistically significant it is small and, even 
though the treatment administered to Group 2 was full enumeration, it is not clear if this 
will have any effect on the results.    17
4. Basic Comparisons across Treatments  
  We calculate seven different indicators of the use of financial services. For the 
institution-based questions that we ask of a household informant (either the head of 
household or a randomly selected adult that is not the head), the seven indicators and the 
survey questions from which they derive are as follows: 
1.  Banked: Some people like to keep their money in an account with a bank.  Do 
you or any member of your household have a bank account? 
 
2.  Indirect access to an account: Do you or other members of your household 
perform banking transactions using someone else’s account? 
 
3.  Formal non-bank savings: Now think of all the ways that you and members of 
your household save money. We are not talking about investing in a business 
or buying land, but only about where you or other household members put 
their money to use later. Have you or anyone in your household used an 
institution such as a credit union or a savings association to save money in the 
past 12 months? 
 
4.  Formal credit: Many people borrow money to buy things on credit. Have you 
or any other member of your household used an institution such as a credit 
union, savings association or bank to borrow money or to buy on credit in the 
past 12 months? 
 
5.  Informal savings: Have you or any other household member used a Susu
8, 
welfare scheme or other savings club to save money in the past 12 months? 
 
6.  Informal credit: Have you or any member of your household used a Susu, 
welfare scheme, or savings club to borrow money in the past 12 months? 
 
7.  Insurance: Many people insure themselves and their possessions against 
unexpected circumstances. Have you or any member of your household used 
an institution to insure yourselves (life, health) or property (household goods, 
house, vehicle and the like) in the past 12 months? That is, do you or anyone 
in the household have any long or short term insurance policies with any 
institution? 
 
                                                 
8 For a small fee, Susu collectors provide an informal means for Ghanaians to securely save and access 
their own money, and gain some limited access to microcredit. Money placed with a Susu collector is held 
in a Susu account.    18
For the full enumeration treatments, we ask the same questions, but with respect 
to individual use. For example, for the banked indicator, we ask simply: “Do you have a 
bank account?” Reponses are aggregated across all members of the household to arrive at 
our measure of household usage. In other words, if one member of the household reports 
having a bank account, then the whole household is considered banked for the full 
enumeration treatments. 
There is an element of subjectivity that went into the crafting of these questions, 
and one might worry that slight tinkering with the institution-based questions could 
increase reported levels of usage. While we recognize this possibility, we worked 
extensively with staff at the Ghana Statistical Service to adapt these questions to the 
country context and we did extensive piloting of these questions (both at GSS and in the 
field) to make sure that the questions were well understood by respondents. We are 
confident, therefore, that these questions represent a reasonable and fair attempt to gather 
data on usage of financial services in Ghana via institution-based questions. Moreover, in 
our first set of comparisons between full enumerations and informants, all respondents 
were asked the same questions. While the usage levels might be affected by the specifics 
of those questions, the differences in the data generated by a full enumeration versus the 
informants are much less likely to be affected. 
For informants and the full enumeration, Table 6 reports the percentage of 
households that use a financial service for each of our seven indicators. For five of the 
seven indicators – banked, indirect access, formal non-bank savings, informal savings, 
and informal credit – household usage rates are almost identical when the head of 
household is the informant or when a full enumeration is undertaken. For formal credit,   19
usage rates reported by the head of household are slightly higher than those from the full 
enumeration treatments, though we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two rates are 
equal to one another. In all, however, the head of household reports information that is 
very similar to that generated by full enumeration.  
This is good news because interviewing only the head is much cheaper than 
interviewing all adult members of a household, an issue we will return to below. 
However, some surveys with a financial services module, such as labor force 
participation surveys, are designed to interview all members of a household. Our results 
provide good news in those cases, too, in that the information generated via the full 
enumeration appears to be a reasonable substitute for that generated by the head of 
household. Because the household usage rates calculated from responses to institution-
based questions are comparable using either method, there is potential to expand 
comparisons across a much broader set of countries. 
In contrast, a randomly selected adult from the household (who is not the head) 
does not provide information that is comparable to that generated by the head or via full 
enumeration. Randomly selected informants produce usage rates that are lower than those 
for the other two methods, and significantly lower for banked, indirect access, and formal 
credit. This pattern suggests that the random informant has substantially less knowledge 
about household use of financial services than does the head of household. We also note 
that the disparities are greatest for services provided by formal institutions. For both 
informal savings and informal credit, the usage rates produced by random informants are 
almost identical to those produced by the head of household or via full enumeration. This   20
could be because many of the informal savings and credit arrangements revolve around 
social activities (meetings) that all household members know about. 
Although the head of household and the full enumeration tend to yield very 
similar usage rates, there is one exception, insurance. One would expect that the full 
enumeration would provide the most complete information and thus produce the highest 
usage levels. And yet, the percentage of households that have insurance is 11.3% when 
information is provided by the head of household and only 7.9% when a full enumeration 
of individual usage is collected. It is conceivable that the head of household has 
purchased insurance for other household members of which those members are not 
aware. Another issue, which we turn to in more detail below, is that the institution-based 
question is a poor method of collecting information on insurance use, and thus none of 
the estimates for that indicator are reliable in Table 6.
9 
Comparisons between usage rates calculated from product- versus institution-
based questions also reveal stark differences across indicators. To calculate product-
based questions, we relied on a series of questions that are similar to those used in 
FinScope surveys. For example, a respondent was considered banked if she responded 
yes to any of the following questions: 
1.  Do you currently have an ATM card? 
2.  Do you currently have a debit card?  
3.  Do you currently have a Savings Plus account?
10 
4.  Do you currently have a current account (checking)? 
5.  Do you currently have a savings account at a bank? 
6.  Do you currently have a PostBank account or a post office savings account? 
                                                 
9 Recall that the head of household is only asked about his or her own personal use of insurance products in 
the full enumerations, and thus it is possible that the full enumeration could yield a smaller average usage 
rate than when the head responds on behalf of the household for the reason mentioned. However, having 
observed the field training, our sense is that institution-based question is simply not a good method for 
collecting reliable information about insurance use. 
10 This is the brand name of a specialized savings account offered by some Ghanaian banks with additional 
features such as limited checking.   21
7.  Do you currently have a bank loan? 
8.  Do you currently have a bank overdraft facility? 
 
The questions underlying each of the indicators appear in Appendix A. Note that 
there is not a product-based indicator for indirect access since there was only one 
question on that topic and it was asked in the same way in both the product-based and 
institution-based questionnaires. That indicator is therefore dropped from subsequent 
tables. 
We focus on individual use of financial services so as not to conflate the effects of 
the method of eliciting household usage information (informant versus full enumeration) 
with the effects of asking product versus institution-based questions. And again, while we 
acknowledge some degree of subjectivity in selecting the questions underlying our 
product-based indicators of usage, we made a concerted effort to adapt those questions to 
the country context. We also selected from the questions that have been used in past 
FinScope surveys. We hope, therefore, that this constitutes a fair test of the importance of 
asking product-based questions in the sense that it represents well the most advanced 
surveys undertaken to date. 
Table 7 shows that the product- and institution-based questions produce very 
similar usage percentages for basic services, such as banked and formal non-bank saving. 
The same is also true for informal credit, suggesting that respondents understand well the 
meaning of informal credit without needing to be cued about specific types of 
arrangements. By contrast, the product-based questions yield much higher usage 
percentages than do the institution-based questions for formal credit (2.8% vs. 0.8%), 
informal savings (18.8% vs. 8.9%), and insurance (18.4% vs. 5.7%), and all of those   22
differences are statistically significant. For these, arguably more complex financial 
services, product-related cues appear to produce a much more complete picture of usage. 
We would expect that, by definition, the level of individual use of financial 
services could not exceed the level of household use. Comparing Tables 6 and 7, we can 
see that this is true for all services except for insurance. For that indicator the individual 
usage rate based on product-related questions far exceeds the household usage rate 
calculated from the institution-based question. We take this as a clear sign that our 
institutional insurance question is not a good substitute for a series of product-related 
questions.  
Nor does the problem appear to stem from the financial knowledge of the 
respondent. We would presume that the head of household is likely to be the most 
financially knowledgeable member of the family, but even when the head is asked about 
his own personal use of insurance products, the product-based usage rate is much higher 
than the institution-based measure (Table 8). A similar pattern holds true for formal 
credit and informal savings, for both household heads and for non-heads, and the 
differences between the product- and institution-based usage rates are statistically 
significant. The evidence in Table 8 points to across-the-board difficulties for all 
respondents with using institution-based questions to gather information on formal credit, 
informal savings, and insurance. 
In summary, the preliminary comparisons across treatment groups indicate that 
the identity of the respondent and the way questions are asked does affect reported usage 
of some financial services. Full enumerations of all household members produce usage 
rates similar to those reported by the head of household, while interviewing a randomly   23
selected non-head produces much lower levels of household usage. Product-related cues 
appear to be important to gain a full understanding of usage of insurance, formal credit, 
and informal savings, but do not appear necessary for more basic services such as bank 
accounts, formal savings, and informal credit. 
5. Regressions 
 
  In this section, we test whether the differences across treatments described in the 
previous section hold up when we control for other factors that could affect usage in 
regressions. Some of those regressions are also designed to identify the characteristics of 
the individuals and households that reported lower levels of usage for institution-based 
versus product-based questions. Another set of regressions examines the household 
characteristics of the randomly selected informants who reported lower household usage 
rates than those obtained from the head of household or the full enumeration of individual 
usage. In this way, we hope to identify the types of respondents that have difficulty with 
certain question formats. 
a.  Household Usage: Full Enumeration vs. Informants 
To describe household usage of financial services, we use the following specification, 
which we estimate via probit: 
Financei =α 
  +β1  Agei
  +β2  Rurali 
  +β3  Sizei 
  +β4  Dependent Sharei
  +β5  Age of Head of HHi
  +β6  Highest Grade, Headi
  +β7  HH Head Numeratei 
  +β8  Share of Agricultural Workersi 
  +β9  Share Employedi 
  +β10 Share Self-employedi 
  +β11 Informant is HH Headi  24
  +β12  Random Informanti 
 + εi 
  
Finance is one of the seven indicators of household use of financial services 
described in Section 4 (banked, indirect access, non-bank saving, informal saving, formal 
credit, informal credit, and insurance). All of those indicators are dummy variables equal 
to 1 if any member of household i uses that service. 
The control variables in the regression are: 
Age, which is the average age of all members of the household. Other factors equal, 
older individuals (and households) might have more experience with use of financial 
services. 
 
Rural, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the household is located in a rural 
area. We expect usage of financial services to be more modest in rural areas because 
of the relatively high costs of providing services to those areas. 
 
Size, which is the number of individuals living in the household. We expect the 
likelihood that someone in the household uses a financial service to be increasing in 
household size. Also, larger households might demand some financial services more 
intensely than smaller ones. 
 
Dependent Share, which is the percentage of household members that are age 18 or 
below or above age 60. Controlling for the size of the household, we expect a higher 
share of dependents to be associated with lower usage rates, because these individuals 
are unlikely to have demand for financial services. 
 
Age of HH head, which is the age of the head of the household in years. Older 
household heads might have more experience with use of financial services, and that 
experience might be passed onto to other members of the household. 
 
Highest Grade, Head, which is the number of grades completed by the head of 
household. Better educated household heads are more likely to use financial services, 
and that experience might also be passed from the head to other household members. 
 
HH head numerate, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the head of the 
household is able to perform simple numerical calculations. Like the completed 
grades variable, numerate heads are themselves more likely to use financial services 
and to pass that experience on to other household members. 
   25
Share in Agriculture, which is the share of household members that work in 
agricultural activities. Agricultural workers might have different financial needs than 
others. 
 
Share Employed, which is the share of household members that are currently 
working. Because the employed are likely to have greater need of financial services, 
we expect this variable to be positively associated with household usage rates. 
 
Share Self-employed, which is the share of household members that are currently self-
employed. Self-employed workers might have different financial needs than others. 
Also, lacking a verifiable regular salary self-employed individuals, especially those 
working in small informal establishments, might find it difficult to obtain financial 
services from formal providers. 
 
HH head, informant, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the head reported on 
the household’s use of financial services. 
 
Random informant, which is a dummy equal to one if a randomly selected adult other 
than the head of household was selected to report on household use of financial 
services. 
 
The informant dummy variables therefore capture the effects on reported household 
usage rates relative to the omitted treatment category, a full enumeration of all adult 
household members’ individual use of financial services. 
  The regression results appear in Table 9. In the regressions that use banked as the 
dependent variable (columns 1 and 2) many of the control variables are significant and of 
the expected sign. In particular, household size, and the age of and the number of grades 
completed by the head of household are all significantly positively linked to being 
banked. Rural location, the share of dependents, and the share of self-employed workers 
are all negatively linked to being banked. We should note that the control variables do a 
better job of explaining variation in the banked indicator than in the other indicators, as 
reflected in both the overall fit of the regressions and the number of significant variables. 
There is also a general tendency for the control variables to explain more variation in the   26
use of services from formal providers (banked, formal non-bank saving, and formal 
credit) than from informal ones (informal credit and informal savings). 
  Controlling for the household characteristics in the regressions, the comparisons 
across the treatment groups remain similar to those in the summary statistics in Table 6. 
There are no significant differences between having the head of household as the 
respondent and a full enumeration, as reflected in the insignificant coefficients for the 
informant = head variable for all indicators. By contrast, the tests of whether the two 
informant coefficients (head versus random) are equal at the bottom of the table reveal 
significant differences for the banked and indirect access indicators. There is no longer a 
significant difference for formal credit, as there was in the summary comparisons, but 
that could be because there is so little usage of formal credit in our sample. In countries 
where formal credit is more prevalent, significant differences might emerge.  
In addition, the coefficient for having a randomly selected informant is negative 
and highly significant for the banked indicator, indicating that the random informant 
provides less complete information on household use of banking services than is derived 
from a full enumeration. In short, though the significance levels are reduced when we 
control for additional factors that affect usage, the same qualitative patterns emerge: the 
head of household and a full enumeration produce similar household usage rates, but a 
randomly selected (non-head) informant produces lower usage rates for services from 
formal providers. 
  To get a better understanding of whether particular household characteristics are 
driving the relatively low usage rates reported by random informants, we interact the 
control variables with the treatment variables. That is, we first multiply the explanatory   27
variables by head = informant to derive a second set of explanatory variables. We then 
derive a third set by doing the same for the random informant variable. We include the 
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Where t refers to our three treatment categories (full enumeration, head of household 
informant, and random informant) and X is the set covariates from our original 
regression. In this way, the control variables are permitted to affect reported usage in 
different ways across treatment categories. 
  We present the full-interaction results only for the banked indicator because the 
usage rate reported by the random informant is significantly lower than for the other two 
treatments. For the indirect access indicator, there is a marginally significant difference 
between random informants and head of household informants, but there is not a 
significant difference between random informants and a full enumeration. Nor do we 
think the indirect access indicator is central to our understanding of usage. The limited 
indirect access that we do find is also not well explained by our control variables.
11 
  For the most part, the determinants of being banked are similar across the three 
treatments, as indicated by the insignificant coefficients on the interaction variables 
(Table 10). The exceptions are worth noting, however. For the trials that use a random 
informant, the share of dependents has a strong negative association with being banked 
(see t-test at bottom of Table 7). Note that for our survey qualifying adults were all 
                                                 
11 It is interesting, however, that the rural dummy is positive and significant in the indirect access 
regression whereas it was negative and significant in the banked regression. Use of someone else’s account 
might be a relatively important means of access in remote areas.   28
household members age 15 or older. Thus, a number of the randomly selected informants 
were dependents under the definition we use to construct the dependent share control 
variable. The negative significant coefficient for dependent share reflects, at least in part, 
the difficulties that young adults face in responding to institution-based questions about 
household use of banking services.
12  
By contrast, there is a positive relationship between the household’s share of 
agricultural workers and being banked for the treatments that used a random informant, 
suggesting perhaps that family members that work together in an agricultural setting are 
knowledgeable about the use of banking services by other household members. That 
statistical relationship is not particularly strong (p-value 0.07), and thus we are reluctant 
to make too much of it. Since the determinants of household use of banking services are 
similar whether usage is reported by a random informant or calculated from a full 
enumeration of individuals’ use, and since the constant is not statistically different for 
those two treatment categories in the full-interaction specification, it appears that 
younger, poorly informed household members were largely responsible for the relatively 
low usage of banking services reported by random informants in the summary statistics in 
Table 6 and the basic regressions in Table 9. 
It is also interesting that the constant is significantly larger for the heads of 
household than for the full enumeration in the full-interaction model (column 2). The vast 
majority of the coefficients for heads of household are insignificant, indicating that the 
determinants of usage are similar for those treatments and the ones that used full 
                                                 
12 When we include a dummy variable indicating that the random respondent is 15-18 years old, it is 
negative and significant while the dependent share variable is no longer significant. This provides 
additional evidence that it is younger respondents who have difficulty providing accurate information about 
household use of banking services.   29
enumeration, but again the exceptions are instructive. The first is that usage of banking 
services is significantly greater in households where the head is numerate under full 
enumeration but not when the head reports on household usage (see t-test at bottom of 
Table 7). This suggests that numerate heads pass on knowledge to other household 
members about banking services that increases their own personal use, but both numerate 
and innumerate heads have a reasonable grasp of household use of banking services when 
they are asked.  
The second difference is that the share of employed household members is 
positive and significant in the full enumeration specifications, presumably because the 
employed have greater need of banking services, but insignificant when the head reports 
on household usage (see t-test at bottom of Table 7). Like the insignificant result for 
numerate heads of household, the one for share of employed household members 
suggests that household heads have knowledge of the use of banking services among the 
employed members of their household that they are able to report when asked the 
institution-based question.  
We acknowledge that we might be reading too much into these results, and that 
they might be open to other interpretations, but to achieve the same rates of use of 
banking services as for full enumeration in the summary statistics in Table 6 and the 
basic regression in Table 9, the results in Table 10 suggest that the head of household has 
substantial knowledge of the use of banking services by other household members. This, 
too, is an encouraging message regarding the comparability of usage rates derived from 
full enumerations and the reports of heads of households. 
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b.  Product vs. Institutional Questions 
 
For the regressions that describe individual use of financial services and compare 
product- versus institution-based questions, we add the following individual 
characteristics to the household characteristics that were used in the regressions in the 
previous section: the number of grades completed by the respondent and two dummy 
variables indicating whether he/she is numerate and employed. We expect all three 
variables to be positively linked to personal use of financial services. We also replace the 
informant dummy variables with a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent 
was asked product-based questions. The coefficient on that variable therefore measures 
reported usage rates relative to the omitted category, respondents who answered 
institution-based questions. 
The regressions results appear in Table 11. The individual characteristics are all 
positive and significant for banked and formal savings (banks + non-banks). Employed 
respondents are significantly more likely to use all types of financial services in Table 11 
except for insurance, and the marginal effects for the non-insurance indicators are large 
when compared with the average individual usage rates in Table 7. The number of grades 
completed by the respondent is associated with greater usage of insurance, however. In 
all, the individual characteristics explain substantial variation in the financial usage 
indicators. 
That said, household characteristics also explain substantial variation in individual 
usage. As in the household usage regressions, average age in the household and the 
number of grades completed by the household head are significantly positively associated 
with the indicators. Rural location and the shares of dependents, agricultural workers and   31
self-employed workers are significantly negatively associated with the indicators.
13  The 
overall fit of the individual usage regressions is also better than the household usage 
regressions as reflected in the pseudo-R
2 values. The significance of the completed 
grades of the household head again suggests that educated household heads pass on 
information about the benefits of using financial services to other household members. 
Most importantly, the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent 
answered product-based questions is positive and significant for informal savings, formal 
credit, and insurance, as was true for the summary comparisons in Table 7. The marginal 
effects of the product-based questions variable are also large in those regressions relative 
to the levels of personal use of those services in Table 7. The regression results reinforce 
the conclusion that product-based cues help respondents to provide a more complete 
picture of their use of those three financial services. For banked, formal savings (banks + 
non-banks), and informal credit, the product-based questions dummy is insignificant, 
indicating again that product-based cues are less important for those services. 
To better identify the types of individuals who benefit most from product-related 
cues, we interact the explanatory variables in the Table 11 with the dummy for product-
based questions for the three services where we found a significant difference in usage 
rates for product- versus institution-based questions (see Table 12). For informal savings, 
the number of grades completed by the head of household is positive and significant for 
the product-based treatments, indicating that educated heads pass on information and 
experience to other household members that increases their likelihood of using those 
                                                 
13 The age of the head of household is negatively associated with indicators of individual usage, whereas it 
was positively associated with household usage. This is because the age of the household head competes 
with the average age of all household members in the individual usage regressions. When one of those 
variables is dropped the other is positive and significant in the regressions in Table 3.   32
financial services, but that those household members benefit from product-related cues 
when asked about their use of those services.  
Although the constant is no longer significantly different in the full-interaction 
specification for product-versus institution-based treatments, all of the coefficients on the 
interaction terms (except for the aforementioned grades attained by the household head) 
are insignificant, indicating that the determinants of reported usage are similar for the two 
question formats, and suggesting that all respondents benefit from product-related cues 
regarding informal savings. We can draw a similar conclusion for formal credit, where 
the constant term remains positive and significant in the full-interaction specification 
(column 6). 
There are however some differences in the determinants of usage of formal credit 
for product and institution-based questions. For example, employed respondents do not 
appear to benefit from product-based cues (i.e., we cannot reject that the net effect of the 
main effect and the interaction with the product dummy is equal to zero for that variable), 
but the number of completed grades is associated with higher usage for product-based 
questions. Those individual characteristics no doubt compete for explanatory power and 
thus it is not so surprising (or revealing) that we get opposite signs for those variables. 
For the institution-based treatment, those signs are reversed. We do not therefore put 
great stock in those coefficients as providing information about the types of individuals 
likely to benefit from product-based cues. We feel we are on firmer ground interpreting 
the significant positive coefficient on the product-based constant as reflecting a general 
problem for all respondents in using institution-based questions regarding formal credit.   33
Finally, with respect to insurance, the interaction terms are all insignificant at the 
five percent level, offering few clues about the type of respondent who would benefit 
most from product-related cues for that service. The constant for the product-based 
treatments is not significant, but it remains positive. The fit of the insurance regressions is 
also poor relative to the other financial indicators. On the basis of the full-interaction 
regression in Table 12, it appears that product-based cues help all respondents with 
questions about use of insurance, rather than a particular subset.  
In sum, the results from the full interaction specifications do not provide firm 
guidance on the types of individuals that benefit most from product-based cues when 
reporting on their personal use of informal savings, formal credit, and insurance. All 
respondents appear to benefit from these cues, as was suggested by the simple sample 
breakdown in Table 8. 
c.  Controlling for Supply Side Effects 
Aside from the dummy variable for rural location, the regressions have included 
only demand-side characteristics of households and survey respondents. Given the 
similarity of the samples for the different treatments described in section 3, we doubt that 
this is a major limitation of our analysis. However, to make sure that supply-side effects – 
meaning the presence of providers of financial services – are not driving the differences 
in reported usage across treatments that we reported above, we run three additional sets 
of regressions. The first uses the travel time (in minutes) to the nearest bank as our 
measure of the local availability of financial services. Unfortunately, we asked this 
question of only a small fraction of the survey respondents, and then only for the 
questionnaires pertaining to individual use of financial services. We therefore run a   34
second set of regressions on the full sample that control for supply-side effects via 
dummy variables corresponding to Ghana’s ten regions.  
We recognize, however, that the availability of financial services at the local level 
might not be well captured by regional dummy variables and so we run a final set of 
regressions that include dummy variables for each enumeration area from which we drew 
observations. Within these local sampling areas, fifteen households were randomly 
selected to answer the Financial Services Survey, and then each was randomly assigned a 
question format so that one-third received questionnaire 1, one-third questionnaire 2, and 
the final third questionnaire 3. This is therefore a highly localized control variable. 
Our main conclusions remain intact when we control for supply-side effects in 
these ways. As in the base regressions, household usage is very similar for full 
enumeration and when the head of household is the informant, and reported usage of 
banking services is significantly lower for the random informant (Appendix B). For 
individual usage, results are also very similar to the base regressions (Appendix C). 
Reported usage is significantly higher for product-based questions for informal savings, 
formal credit, and insurance. This pattern holds for the limited sample when we include 
the question on travel time to the nearest bank, and for the broader sample when we 
include region or enumeration area fixed effects. It seems unlikely therefore that the 
omission of supply-side variables from our base regressions could be driving our results. 
6.  Conclusions 
Measuring the breadth of outreach of financial sectors in developing countries 
remains a challenge, but one that must be met if we are to better understand how financial 
services (or their absence) affects the livelihoods of the poor.  Surveys of individuals and   35
households about their use of financial services hold the most promise for measuring 
outreach well, but their cost and the other logistical hurdles have made it difficult to 
develop a standard method of questioning that would generate comparable financial 
usage data across countries and within countries over time. Our experimental analysis 
was designed to contribute to our understanding about the comparability of financial 
usage data generated under different question formats. 
Our main findings are straightforward, intuitive, and, we hope, useful for future 
data gathering efforts. We find that rates of household usage are similar when the head 
reports on behalf of the household or when the rate is tabulated from a full enumeration 
of individual use. By contrast, randomly selected informants provide a less complete 
picture of household use of financial services than the other two methods. The 
comparability of data across the head of household and the full enumeration is potentially 
important because interviewing only the head is much less costly than interviewing all 
household members. At the same time, some surveys, for example those measuring labor 
force participation, are designed to be full enumerations. By using the head of household 
when possible and a full enumeration when it is dictated for other reasons, there is 
potential to increase the number of countries for which comparable data can be generated. 
For formal credit, informal savings, and insurance we find higher reported usage 
when questions are asked about specific financial products rather than about the 
respondents’ dealings with types of financial institutions. Product-related cues appear to 
be important for respondents regarding these services, and not just those who we would 
expect to be less financially knowledgeable. Although we only tested product-based and 
institution-based usage in the context of personal use of financial services, it would seem   36
likely that the product-related cues would also benefit respondents when informing about 
household usage of those services. We would recommend, therefore, that the institution-
based questions used in the financial modules of larger, sometimes multi-purpose, 
surveys be adapted to include product-based cues that are appropriate to the country 
context. 
Decisions on future questionnaires will also need to take into account the relative 
costs of implementing the different treatments.  We find that the costs of the different 
treatments (in terms of interview time) administered conform to expectations.
14  The full 
enumeration using the product list takes the longest to administer.  But, full enumeration 
itself, using either the product or institution questionnaire adds significant time to the 
interviews compared to using a proxy respondent for the household.  In other words, the 
finding that the head of household is able to provide similar data to that obtained from 
full enumeration for most products has positive implications for the feasibility of 
expanding data collection on financial service use to other countries.  Finally, however, 
for survey designers in countries that may have higher levels of financial service use, it is 
also important to note how much average interview time rises when household use of 
financial services is higher. For example, the full enumeration product-based format in 
questionnaire 1 took 20-30% more time to administer when members of the household 
used banking or insurance services than when they did not (See Table 13.)  
Lurking throughout our paper is a concern about our ability to generalize beyond 
Ghana. While we feel that there is a strong undercurrent of common sense to our main 
                                                 
14 The time data collected in this survey are, at best, a rough approximation of the actual time required.  No 
effort was made to record time at the level of the specific product or institution modules.  Only a total for 
the entire household interview, which includes a roster and further questions on attitudes and knowledge of 
finance, is available.  Also as Groups 2 and 3 contain two different treatments, it is not possible to really 
separate out the time costs associated with each one.   37
findings, and thus what we find is likely to be relevant in other countries as well, our 
paper is in the end about Ghana. While Ghana might be an adequate reflection of low-
income countries in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, it is unlikely to be reflective of the 
whole developing world. The best we can do in the context of this paper is simply to 
acknowledge this limitation, but going forward we can and will repeat this type of 
experiment in other countries. We have already done so in Timor Leste, where very few 
respondents use any financial services, and so the differences across treatments were not 
significant, which suggests that the concerns raised in our analysis are of second order 
importance in the most financially under-developed countries. A similar experiment is 
also underway for Jamaica. 
We would remind readers that we live in a world of rough approximation when it 
comes to measuring the outreach of the financial systems of developing countries. The 
reliability of estimates from accounts-based approaches and approaches that meld 
accounts-based and survey-based information via regressions is difficult to assess. Our 
hope is that our results provide some practical guidance on how to generate comparable 
financial usage data across countries via surveys, as surveys would appear to represent 
the best vehicle for generating accurate data.   38
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Table 1: Treatments 
 Questionnaire  Administered
Respondent Product Institutional














Note:  Each ‘Group’ represents a different questionnaire that was fielded.  The ‘n’ is the 
number of households, household heads, randomly selected adults or individuals who 
were administered the questionnaire. 
 
 
Table 2:   Enumeration Areas from the GLSS5 
used for Financial Service Survey Sample 
 
Regions  GLSS5 Cycle10  GLSS5 Cycle 11  
Total    Urban EAs  Rural EAs Urban EAs  Rural EAs 
Northern  1  5  -  6    12 
Upper East  1  2  -  3    6 
Upper West  -  3  -  3    6 
Ashanti 3  6  3  6    18 
Eastern 2  4  2  4    12 
Brong Ahafo  2  4  -  6   12 
Volta -  6  -  6    12 
Western 4  2  3  3    12 
Central 6  -  4  2    12 
Greater Accra  6  3  8  1   18 
Total         25         35        20         40  120 
Source:  GSS  
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 Mean  Mean  t-statistic 
  St. Dev  St. Dev  p-value 
Coastal 29.65  33.12  3.21 
 45.68  47.07  0.00 
Forest 40.83  38.87  1.70 
 49.15  48.76  0.09 
Savanah 29.52  28.01  1.41 
 45.61  44.91  0.16 
Rural 58.35  62.35  3.46 
 49.30  48.46  0.00 
Female Head of Household  27.88  28.62  0.70 
 44.84  45.21  0.48 
Literate Head of Household  47.79  44.35  2.94 
 49.95  49.69  0.00 
Numerate Head of Household  64.24  64.16  0.06 
 47.93  47.96  0.95 
Age of Head of Household  45.34  45.51  0.46 
 15.63  15.64  0.65 
Extended Family  26.82  27.97  1.10 
 44.31  44.89  0.27 
Household Size  4.20  4.22  0.24 
 2.83  2.87  0.81 
Agricultural Workers in Household  65.10  69.50  3.96 
 47.67  46.05  0.00 
Self-Employed Workers in Household 69.59  70.72  1.06 
 46.01  45.51  0.29 
Employees in Household  23.56  23.56  0.00 
 42.44  42.45  1.00 
Individual      
Age 19.62  24.04  0.66 
 19.56  24.19  0.51 
Male 48.69  49.31  1.08 
 49.98  50.00  0.28 
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Table 4:  Factors Affecting Attrition between GLSS 5 
and FSS  
 
 (1)  (2) 
 (Coefficient)  (Marginal  Effects) 
Rural -0.177**  0.037** 
 [0.079]  [0.017] 
Household Size-only members  -0.169  -0.034 
 [0.110]  [0.022] 
Extended family  0.036  0.007 
 [0.093]  [0.019] 
No. of children ages 0-5  -0.066  -0.013 
 [0.120]  [0.024] 
No. of children ages 6-12  0.096  0.019 
 [0.116]  [0.023] 
No. of children ages 13-18  0.017  0.003 
 [0.117]  [0.024] 
No. of adults ages 19-59  0.074  0.015 
 [0.105]  [0.021] 
Hhld head female  -0.077  -0.015 
 [0.087]  [0.017] 
Hhld head age, years  -0.010***  -0.002*** 
 [0.003]  [0.001] 
Hhld head married or union  0.026  0.005 
 [0.087]  [0.017] 
Hhld head attended schooling  -0.004  -0.001 
 [0.083]  [0.017] 
Hhld with agr worker(s)  -0.040  -0.008 
 [0.089]  [0.018] 
Hhld with employee(s)  0.138  0.029 
 [0.089]  [0.020] 
Hhld with employer(s)  0.162  0.036 
 [0.139]  [0.033] 
Head worked in Last 7 days  -0.357***  -0.084*** 
 [0.115]  [0.031] 
Head migrant  -0.066  -0.014 
 [0.069]  [0.014] 
Constant 0.291   
 [0.199]   
Observations 2282  2282 
Note: Standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Household and Individual Characteristics across 
Treatment Groups   
  Means by Groups  T-tests of equivalence of means 
Treatment Group  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
Groups 
 1 & 2 
Groups 
 2 & 3 
Groups  









 p value 
t-statistic 
 p value 
t-statistic 
 p value 
          
Coastal  30.5  29.6 29.3 0.37 0.12 0.49 
  (46.1) (45.7)  (45.5)  0.71 0.90 0.62 
 Forest  40.6  41.4 40.2 0.30 0.45 0.15 
  (49.1) (49.3)  (49.1)  0.76 0.65 0.88 
Savannah  28.9  29.0 30.5 0.05 0.60 0.65 
  (45.3) (45.4)  (46.1)  0.96 0.55 0.51 
Rural  64.4 650 65.7 0.20 0.28 0.49 
  (47.9) (47.7)  (47.5)  0.84 0.78 0.63 
Female head of household  26.4  28.8 29.7 0.97 0.37 1.34 
  (44.1) (45.3)  (45.7)  0.33 0.71 0.18 
Literate head of household  41.8  41.4 43.9 0.15 0.88 0.74 
  (49.4) (49.3)  (49.7)  0.88 0.38 0.46 
Numerate head of household  63.5  60.7 62.8 1.03 0.77 0.26 
  (48.2) (48.9)  (48.4) .0.31  0.44  0.80 
Age of head of household  46.0  46.4 46.5 0.39 0.17 0.57 
  (15.5) (15.7)  (15.1)  0.70 0.87 0.57 
Extended family  29.6  28.0 30.8 0.63 1.09 0.47 
  (45.7) (45.0)  (46.2)  0.53 0.27 0.64 
 Household size  4.50 4.24  4.59  1.63 2.15 0.56 
  (2.86) (2.92)  (2.98)  0.10 0.03 0.57 
 Agricultural workers in hhld  72.7  71.2 71.9 0.60 0.30 0.30 
  (44.6) (45.3)  (45.0)  0.55 0.77 0.76 
Self-employed workers in hhld  73.3  75.1 74.4 0.74 0.30 0.44 
  (44.6) (43.3)  (43.7)  0.46 0.76 0.66 
Employees in household  22.6  21.7 21.4 0.41 0.11 0.52 
  (41.9) (41.2)  (41.0)  0.68 0.91 0.60 
Individual         
Age  23.7  24.3 23.7 1.10 1.13 0.02 
  (19.6) (20.0)  (19.6)  0.27 0.26 0.98 
 Male  49.4  49.1 49.2 0.19 0.04 0.15 
  (50.0) (50.0)  (50.0)  0.84 0.97 0.88 
               
    45
Table 6           
Percentage of Households That Use 
Financial Services  
(Standard errors in parentheses)                   
Survey Type  Banked  Indirect  Formal Formal Informal Informal Insurance 
    Access  Non-Bank  Credit  Savings  Credit     
         Saving             
             
Head of Household  26.5%  6.4%  3.0%  3.3% 19.7% 4.2% 11.3% 
n=638  (1.7%) (1.0%) (0.7%) (0.7%) (1.6%) (0.8%) (1.3%) 
             
Random Household Member  10.0%  3.3%  1.7%  1.5% 17.7% 4.2% 10.6% 
n=480  (1.4%) (0.8%) (0.6%) (0.5%) (1.7%) (0.9%) (1.4%) 
             
Full Enumeration  25.5%  5.1%  2.5% 1.9%  17.3%  4.2% 7.9% 
 n=643  (1.7%)  (0.9%) (0.6%) (0.5%) (1.5%) (0.8%) (1.1%) 
             
T-tests of equivalence of 
means            
Head vs. Random  7.05  2.33  1.41 1.94 0.86 0.05 0.35 
p-value  0.00 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.39 0.96 0.73 
             
Head vs. Full Enumeration  0.40  0.99 0.54 1.61 1.15 0.03 2.04 
p-value  0.69 0.32 0.59 0.11 0.25 0.98 0.04 
             
Full Enumeration vs. Random  6.69  1.46 0.94 0.52 0.19 0.03 1.55 
p-value  0.00 0.14 0.35 0.60 0.85 0.98 0.12 
                       
 
 
Table 7        
Percentage of Individuals That Use Financial Services: Product vs. Institutional 
Questions 
(Standard errors in parentheses)    
Survey Type  Banked  Formal  Formal Informal  Informal Insurance
      Saving  Credit Savings  Credit    
     B a n k s   +         
      Non-Banks          
            
Questions on Use of Products  14.3%  14.2% 2.8% 18.8% 2.0% 18.4% 
n=2201  (0.7%) (0.7%) (0.4%) (0.8%) (0.3%) (0.8%) 
            
Questions on Use of Institutions  13.3% 13.8%  0.8%  8.9% 2.2% 5.7% 
n=1568  (0.9%) (0.9%) (0.2%) (0.7%) (0.4%) (0.6%) 
            
T-tests of equivalence of means           
Products vs. Institutions  0.88  0.39 4.32 8.49 0.46 11.57 
p-value  0.38 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 
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Table 8        
Percentage of Individuals That Use Financial Services: Product vs. Institutional Questions 
(Standard errors in parentheses)    
Survey Type  Banked  Formal  Formal Informal  Informal Insurance
      Saving  Credit Savings  Credit    
     B a n k s   +         
      Non-Banks          
            
Household Heads          
            
Questions on Use of Products  22.8%  22.7% 4.6% 21.9% 2.4% 20.8% 
n=2201  (1.3%) (1.3%) (0.7%) (1.3%) (0.5%) (1.3%) 
            
Questions on Use of Institutions  23.8% 24.5%  1.4%  12.7% 2.7%  7.5% 
n=1568  (1.7%) (1.7%) (0.5%) (1.3%) (0.6%) (1.0%) 
            
T-tests of equivalence of means           
Products vs. Institutions  0.48  0.81 3.50 4.70 0.40 7.29 
p-value  0.63 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.00 
            
Non-Household Heads          
            
Questions on Use of Products  7.4% 7.4% 1.4%  16.3%  1.6% 16.4% 
n=2201  (0.8%) (0.8%) (0.3%) (1.1%) (0.4%) (1.1%) 
            
Questions on Use of Institutions  6.0% 6.5% 0.4% 6.3% 1.8% 4.4% 
n=1568  (0.8%) (0.8%) (0.2%) (0.8%) (0.4%) (0.7%) 
            
T-tests of equivalence of means           
Products vs. Institutions  1.29  0.89 2.25 7.10 0.34 8.91 
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Table 9: Household Usage Rates Regressions 
 Banked   Indirect  access 
to account 
Formal non-bank 
savings  Informal savings    Formal credit  Informal credit  Insurance 




effect  Coefficient Marginal




effect  Coefficient Marginal
effect  Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
 (1)  (2)    (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)    (9) (10)  (11) (12)  (13) (14) 
Average age of HH  -0.0035  -0.0009    0.0045 0.0004  0.0065 0.0002  -0.0020 -0.0005    0.0152* 0.0005*  -0.0030  -0.0002  0.0023  0.0004 
 Members  (0.0042)  (0.0011)   (0.0058) (0.0005)  (0.0079) (0.0003)  (0.0037) (0.0009)    (0.0084) (0.0003)  (0.0055) (0.0004)  (0.0042) (0.0006) 
Rural Dummy  -0.2229***  -0.0582***    0.2504* 0.0226*  -0.1498 -0.0053 -0.2222*** -0.0569***    0.0580 0.0019  -0.3568*** -0.0282*** 0.1146 0.0175 
   (0.0859)  (0.0224)    (0.1293) (0.0116)  (0.1600) (0.0057)  (0.0846) (0.0217)    (0.1747) (0.0058)  (0.1309) (0.0103)  (0.1013) (0.0155) 
Household Size  0.0467***  0.0122***    0.0193 0.0017  0.0151 0.0005  0.0064 0.0016    0.0967*** 0.0032*** 0.0198  0.0016  0.0326*  0.0050* 
   (0.0148)  (0.0039)    (0.0221) (0.0020)  (0.0291) (0.0010)  (0.0150) (0.0038)    (0.0269) (0.0009)  (0.0213) (0.0017)  (0.0168) (0.0026) 
Share of dependents  -0.6061***  -0.1583***    -0.0383 -0.0035  0.4626  0.0163  -0.1255 -0.0322    -0.8710** -0.0291**  0.2597  0.0205  0.0204  0.0031 
 (0.1761)  (0.0458)    (0.2494) (0.0225)  (0.3593) (0.0127)  (0.1733) (0.0444)    (0.3814) (0.0123)  (0.2798) (0.0220)  (0.2048) (0.0313) 
Age of HH Head  0.0143***  0.0037***    -0.0016 -0.0001  -0.0100 -0.0004  -0.0030 -0.0008    -0.0094 -0.0003  -0.0028 -0.0002  0.0090**  0.0014** 
   (0.0041)  (0.0011)    (0.0059) (0.0005)  (0.0082) (0.0003)  (0.0036) (0.0009)    (0.0089) (0.0003)  (0.0054) (0.0004)  (0.0043) (0.0007) 
Number of completed  0.0301***  0.0079***    0.0176*** 0.0016*** 0.0188*** 0.0007*** 0.0046  0.0012    0.0194*** 0.0006*** -0.0043  -0.0003  0.0086**  0.0013** 
  grades, HH Head  (0.0038)  (0.0010)    (0.0051) (0.0005)  (0.0061) (0.0002)  (0.0037) (0.0009)    (0.0067) (0.0002)  (0.0056) (0.0004)  (0.0043) (0.0007) 
Is HH head numerate?  0.1806  0.0462    0.1321 0.0116  0.4030 0.0132  0.2853***  0.0708***    -0.0065 -0.0002  0.2477  0.0187  0.4338***  0.0623*** 
   (0.1120)  (0.0279)    (0.1617) (0.0138)  (0.2533) (0.0072)  (0.1049) (0.0251)    (0.2326) (0.0078)  (0.1600) (0.0115)  (0.1341) (0.0179) 
Share of Agricultural   0.0279  0.0073    -0.1066 -0.0096  -0.0453 -0.0016  -0.1533 -0.0393    -0.0160 -0.0005  0.2109  0.0167 -0.6734*** -0.1029*** 
 Workers  in  HH  (0.1366)  (0.0357)   (0.2029) (0.0183)  (0.2918) (0.0103)  (0.1351) (0.0346)    (0.2701) (0.0090)  (0.2123) (0.0168)  (0.1770) (0.0265) 
Share of Employed   0.2192  0.0572    0.4193 0.0378  0.2687 0.0095  -0.2638 -0.0676    0.3888 0.0130  -0.1060 -0.0084  0.1741 0.0266 
  Members of HH  (0.1997)  (0.0522)    (0.2807) (0.0253)  (0.3609) (0.0129)  (0.2083) (0.0533)    (0.3793) (0.0130)  (0.3076) (0.0243)  (0.2528) (0.0386) 
Share of Self-employed  -0.4002**  -0.1045**    0.3462 0.0312  -0.3879  -0.0137 -0.1296 -0.0332    0.1963 0.0066 -0.8091**  -0.0639** 0.3543 0.0541 
  members of HH  (0.1811)  (0.0472)    (0.2595) (0.0233)  (0.4026) (0.0141)  (0.1775) (0.0455)    (0.3694) (0.0124)  (0.3199) (0.0243)  (0.2204) (0.0336) 
Informant = Head of HH  0.0666  0.0175    0.0807 0.0074  0.0500 0.0018  0.0981 0.0254    0.1385 0.0048  0.0135 0.0011  0.1695 0.0268 
   (0.0888)  (0.0235)    (0.1249) (0.0117)  (0.1670) (0.0061)  (0.0878) (0.0230)    (0.1737) (0.0064)  (0.1372) (0.0109)  (0.1080) (0.0176) 
Informant = Random  -0.7691***  -0.1678***    -0.1928 -0.0161  -0.1581 -0.0052  0.0027  0.0007    -0.1436 -0.0045  -0.0311 -0.0024  0.1676  0.0271 
 Non-Head  (0.1121)  (0.0197)   (0.1540) (0.0119)  (0.1995) (0.0060)  (0.0972) (0.0249)    (0.2184) (0.0063)  (0.1478) (0.0114)  (0.1169) (0.0199) 
Constant -1.4922***      -2.4670***  -2.6102***  -0.7018***     -2.7882***  -1.4918***  -2.4824***  
 (0.2098)      (0.3098)   (0.4343)   (0.2040)     (0.4471)   (0.3146)   (0.2602)  
Observations  1734  1734  1734  1734  1734  1734  1734 
Log-likelihood -750.0507    -328.7997  -177.3867  -795.1034    -163.9581  -290.1617  -521.7790 
Pseudo-R2  0.1785     0.0632    0.1194    0.0377     0.1211    0.0414    0.0729 
Chi2_head_random  43.3349***    2.7611* 0.9696  0.7934    1.6970 0.0720 0.0002 
p_head_random  [0.0000]     [0.0966]    [0.3248]    [0.3731]     [0.1927]    [0.7884]    [0.9878] 
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Table 10: Household Usage Rates Regressions, Banked Indicators, Full Interactions 







 Interaction  terms 
Main effects 
(full enumeration) 
 Interaction  terms 
   Informant = 
Head of HH 
Informant =  
Random Non-Head   Informant =  
Head of HH 
Informant =  
Random Non-Head
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6) 
Average age of HH  -0.0056    -0.0196  0.0123  -0.0014    -0.0051  0.0032 
  members  (0.0079)   (0.0226)  (0.0101)  (0.0020)   (0.0058)  (0.0026) 
Rural  Dummy  -0.1536   -0.1298  -0.1064  -0.0397   -0.0325  -0.0266 
    (0.1370)   (0.1915)  (0.2596)  (0.0354)   (0.0464)  (0.0628) 
Household  Size  0.0610**   -0.0204  -0.0064  0.0157**   -0.0053  -0.0016 
    (0.0260)   (0.0352)  (0.0425)  (0.0067)   (0.0091)  (0.0110) 
Share of dependents  -0.2184    -0.5899  -1.0313*  -0.0564    -0.1524  -0.2664* 
  (0.2719)   (0.3913)  (0.5812)  (0.0702)   (0.1010)  (0.1493) 
Age of HH Head  0.0211***    0.0091  -0.0107  0.0054***    0.0023  -0.0028 
    (0.0064)   (0.0224)  (0.0095)  (0.0016)   (0.0058)  (0.0025) 
Number of completed  0.0290***    0.0106  -0.0102  0.0075***    0.0027  -0.0026 
  grades, HH Head  (0.0060)    (0.0089)  (0.0107)  (0.0016)    (0.0023)  (0.0028) 
Is HH head numerate?  0.3716**    -0.3741  -0.2127  0.0921**    -0.0875*  -0.0512 
    (0.1727)   (0.2482)  (0.3408)  (0.0409)   (0.0521)  (0.0762) 
Share of Agricultural   -0.0578    -0.0385  0.7349*  -0.0149    -0.0100  0.1898* 
  Workers  in  HH  (0.2220)   (0.3017)  (0.4397)  (0.0574)   (0.0779)  (0.1130) 
Share of Employed   0.5875**    -0.8293*  0.2356  0.1517**    -0.2142*  0.0608 
  Members of HH  (0.2897)    (0.4311)  (0.7490)  (0.0750)    (0.1113)  (0.1935) 
Share of Self-employed  -0.2965    0.0344  -0.9794  -0.0766    0.0089  -0.2530 
  members of HH  (0.2938)    (0.3947)  (0.6670)  (0.0758)    (0.1019)  (0.1717) 
Constant -2.1828***    1.2110***  0.2447      0.3499**  0.0666 
  (0.3399)   (0.4590)  (0.6873)     (0.1403)  (0.1963) 
Observations  1734 
Log-likelihood -732.8796 
Pseudo-R2  0.1973 
Is HH head numerate?  -0.0025 
  (Main + interaction w/ head)  [0.9888] 
Share of Employed Members   -0.2418 
  (Main + interaction w/ head)  [0.4488] 
Share of dependents   -1.2497** 
  (Main + interaction w/ random)  [0.0150] 
Share of Agricultural Workers  0.6770* 
   (Main + interaction w/ random)  [0.0745] 
 Table 11: Individual Usage Rates Regressions, Product Versus Institutional Questions 
 Banked  Formal  saving 
(Banks + non-banks)s  Informal savings  Formal credit  Informal credit  Insurance 
  Coefficient  Marginal 
effect  Coefficient Marginal
effect  Coefficient Marginal
effect  Coefficient  Marginal
effect  Coefficient Marginal
effect  Coefficient Marginal
effect 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Average age of HH  0.0297***  0.0048***  0.0307***  0.0050***  0.0097***  0.0020***  0.0269***  0.0004***  0.0042  0.0002  0.0113***  0.0019*** 
  Members  (0.0025) (0.0004)  (0.0025) (0.0004)  (0.0022) (0.0005)  (0.0059) (0.0001)  (0.0040) (0.0001)  (0.0022) (0.0004) 
Rural Dummy  -0.2003***  -0.0339***  -0.1966*** -0.0336*** -0.2631*** -0.0566*** 0.1309  0.0019  -0.4195*** -0.0189*** -0.0054  -0.0009 
    (0.0701) (0.0124)  (0.0698) (0.0124)  (0.0658) (0.0149)  (0.1375) (0.0019)  (0.1269) (0.0068)  (0.0685) (0.0117) 
Household  Size  0.0070 0.0011  0.0030 0.0005  -0.0248**  -0.0051**  0.0290 0.0004  -0.0479**  -0.0018**  0.0144 0.0025 
    (0.0118) (0.0019)  (0.0119) (0.0019)  (0.0109) (0.0022)  (0.0208) (0.0003)  (0.0207) (0.0008)  (0.0107) (0.0018) 
Share of dependents  -0.2695*  -0.0434*  -0.2540*  -0.0414*  -0.1279  -0.0260  -0.1186  -0.0018  -0.0021  -0.0001  0.1432  0.0244 
  (0.1404) (0.0226)  (0.1398) (0.0228)  (0.1322) (0.0269)  (0.2793) (0.0043)  (0.2427) (0.0091)  (0.1400) (0.0238) 
Age of HH Head  -0.0114***  -0.0018***  -0.0141*** -0.0023*** -0.0112*** -0.0023*** -0.0186***  -0.0003*** -0.0042  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0000 
    (0.0029) (0.0005)  (0.0029) (0.0005)  (0.0026) (0.0005)  (0.0065) (0.0001)  (0.0045) (0.0002)  (0.0026) (0.0004) 
Number of completed  0.0086**  0.0014**  0.0133***  0.0022***  0.0081**  0.0017**  0.0279***  0.0004***  0.0054  0.0002  0.0172***  0.0029*** 
  grades,  HH  Head  (0.0039) (0.0006)  (0.0039) (0.0006)  (0.0037) (0.0007)  (0.0078) (0.0001)  (0.0070) (0.0003)  (0.0037) (0.0006) 
Is HH head numerate?  0.0026  0.0004  -0.0810  -0.0133  0.0662  0.0134  -0.5341**  -0.0098**  -0.1729  -0.0067  -0.1019  -0.0176 
    (0.1283) (0.0206)  (0.1285) (0.0214)  (0.1055) (0.0212)  (0.2555) (0.0060)  (0.1950) (0.0079)  (0.1119) (0.0195) 
Share of Agricultural   -0.2261*  -0.0364*  -0.1714  -0.0279  -0.3506*** -0.0714*** 0.2486  0.0038  -0.0373  -0.0014  -0.6527*** -0.1111***
  Workers  in  HH  (0.1208) (0.0194)  (0.1194) (0.0194)  (0.1100) (0.0224)  (0.2255) (0.0035)  (0.2018) (0.0075)  (0.1253) (0.0210) 
Share of Employed   0.2978*  0.0480*  0.2838*  0.0462*  -0.2293  -0.0467  -0.0433  -0.0007  -0.8983*** -0.0336*** 0.1192  0.0203 
  Members  of  HH  (0.1624) (0.0263)  (0.1614) (0.0264)  (0.1563) (0.0318)  (0.2934) (0.0045)  (0.3097) (0.0114)  (0.1712) (0.0291) 
Share of Self-employed  -0.4587***  -0.0739***  -0.4580*** -0.0746*** -0.3188**  -0.0649**  -0.7274**  -0.0111**  -1.3982*** -0.0524*** 0.1525 0.0260 
  Members  of  HH  (0.1631) (0.0263)  (0.1613) (0.0263)  (0.1458) (0.0296)  (0.3350) (0.0056)  (0.3245) (0.0112)  (0.1615) (0.0275) 
Number of completed  0.0279***  0.0045***  0.0227***  0.0037***  -0.0027  -0.0005  0.0097  0.0001  -0.0044  -0.0002  0.0122***  0.0021*** 
  grades,  respondent  (0.0045) (0.0007)  (0.0045) (0.0007)  (0.0042) (0.0009)  (0.0080) (0.0001)  (0.0080) (0.0003)  (0.0043) (0.0007) 
Is respondent numerate?  0.2519*  0.0394*  0.3290**  0.0516**  0.1635  0.0327  0.2476  0.0036  -0.1030  -0.0039  0.0948  0.0160 
  (0.1310) (0.0198)  (0.1310) (0.0197)  (0.1078) (0.0212)  (0.2584) (0.0037)  (0.2009) (0.0079)  (0.1154) (0.0192) 
Is  respondent  employed? 0.3364*** 0.0483***  0.3510*** 0.0507***  0.5876*** 0.1002***  1.0938*** 0.0106***  0.6326*** 0.0176***  -0.0437 -0.0075 
  (0.0854) (0.0109)  (0.0857) (0.0109)  (0.0817) (0.0115)  (0.3040) (0.0024)  (0.1687) (0.0035)  (0.0766) (0.0134) 
Product  0.0849 0.0135  0.0509 0.0082 0.4714***  0.0919***  0.5968***  0.0086*** -0.0753  -0.0029 0.7970***  0.1265*** 
  (0.0608) (0.0096)  (0.0603) (0.0097)  (0.0577) (0.0107)  (0.1341) (0.0026)  (0.0999) (0.0039)  (0.0664) (0.0095) 
Constant  -2.4161***   -2.3123***  -1.3064***  -4.2915***   -1.4422***  -2.4837***  
  (0.1859)   (0.1842)   (0.1678)   (0.4658)   (0.3041)   (0.1848)  
Observations 3630 3630 3630 3630 3630 3630 
Log-likelihood -1122.7392  -1137.7028  -1375.6403 -287.2571  -343.8571 -1203.8389 
Pseudo-R2  0.2379   0.2343   0.1040   0.2134   0.0682   0.1543 
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Table 12: Individual Usage Rates Regressions, Product Versus Institutional Questions, Full Intereactions 
































  (1) (2)    (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10) (11)  (12) 
Average age of HH  0.0084** 0.0022    0.0017** 0.0004  0.0285** 0.0001  0.0001** 0.0000  0.0094** 0.0025  0.0016** 0.0004 
 members  (0.0037) (0.0046)    (0.0007) (0.0009)  (0.0134) (0.0152)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0039) (0.0047)  (0.0006) (0.0008) 
Rural Dummy  -0.2442**  -0.0196    -0.0523**  -0.0040  0.1609 -0.0110  0.0004 -0.0000  0.1771 -0.2483  0.0285 -0.0404 
   (0.1122) (0.1389)    (0.0252) (0.0281)  (0.2905) (0.3323)  (0.0008) (0.0010)  (0.1324) (0.1552)  (0.0204) (0.0245) 
Household Size  -0.0285 0.0060    -0.0058 0.0012  -0.0023 0.0407  -0.0000 0.0001  0.0086 0.0081  0.0015 0.0014 
   (0.0185) (0.0229)    (0.0038) (0.0047)  (0.0511) (0.0562)  (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0199) (0.0237)  (0.0033) (0.0040) 
Share of dependents  -0.1560 0.0325    -0.0318 0.0066  -0.9130 0.9851  -0.0027 0.0029  0.3415 -0.2706  0.0573 -0.0454 
  (0.2370) (0.2861)    (0.0482) (0.0583)  (0.6124) (0.6931)  (0.0018) (0.0021)  (0.3059) (0.3453)  (0.0513) (0.0579) 
Age of HH Head  -0.0098** -0.0021    -0.0020** -0.0004  -0.0119  -0.0106  -0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0063  0.0082  -0.0011  0.0014 
   (0.0044) (0.0054)    (0.0009) (0.0011)  (0.0141) (0.0161)  (0.0000) (0.0001)  (0.0051) (0.0060)  (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Number of completed  -0.0023 0.0164**    -0.0005 0.0033** 0.0414***  -0.0181 0.0001***  -0.0001  0.0121*  0.0081  0.0020*  0.0014 
  grades, HH Head  (0.0064) (0.0079)    (0.0013) (0.0016)  (0.0144) (0.0172)  (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0070) (0.0083)  (0.0012) (0.0014) 
Is HH head numerate?  0.0851 -0.0426    0.0172 -0.0086  -0.8876 0.4259  -0.0043 0.0016  0.2386  -0.4817* 0.0390  -0.0740* 
   (0.1850) (0.2258)    (0.0370) (0.0453)  (0.5929) (0.6609)  (0.0048) (0.0033)  (0.2203) (0.2565)  (0.0349) (0.0361) 
Share of Agricultural   -0.4621** 0.1544    -0.0941** 0.0314  0.1901  0.0185  0.0006  0.0001  -0.9043***  0.3032 -0.1518***  0.0509 
 Workers  in  HH  (0.1942) (0.2362)    (0.0394) (0.0481)  (0.4714) (0.5402)  (0.0015) (0.0016)  (0.2795) (0.3139)  (0.0455) (0.0523) 
Share of Employed   -0.4273 0.2831    -0.0870 0.0576  -0.0764 0.0203  -0.0002 0.0001  -0.0434 0.2053  -0.0073 0.0345 
  Members of HH  (0.3013) (0.3535)    (0.0613) (0.0720)  (0.5943) (0.6880)  (0.0017) (0.0020)  (0.3601) (0.4107)  (0.0605) (0.0689) 
Share of Self-employed  -0.3387 0.0223    -0.0690 0.0045  -1.4027*  0.8296 -0.0042*  0.0025  -0.4379 0.7022  -0.0735 0.1179 
  members of HH  (0.2672) (0.3193)    (0.0543) (0.0650)  (0.8341) (0.9156)  (0.0024) (0.0026)  (0.3866) (0.4277)  (0.0647) (0.0715) 
Number of completed  -0.0020 -0.0008    -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0334**  0.0575***  -0.0001**  0.0002***  0.0051  0.0103  0.0009  0.0017 
 grades,  respondent  (0.0073) (0.0090)    (0.0015) (0.0018)  (0.0161) (0.0189)  (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0078) (0.0094)  (0.0013) (0.0016) 
Is respondent numerate?  0.3323* -0.2598    0.0654* -0.0506  1.0613* -1.0544  0.0034* -0.0028  -0.0513  0.1913  -0.0087  0.0334 
  (0.1910) (0.2322)    (0.0362) (0.0431)  (0.6035) (0.6737)  (0.0028) (0.0023)  (0.2189) (0.2581)  (0.0372) (0.0468) 
Is respondent employed?  0.4990*** 0.1331    0.0874*** 0.0273  6.5067***  -5.4613***  0.0597***  -0.2435***  0.0639  -0.1303  0.0105  -0.0217 
  (0.1382) (0.1715)    (0.0204) (0.0356)  (0.8248) (0.8894)  (0.0202) (0.1163)  (0.1453) (0.1716)  (0.0233) (0.0283) 
Constant  -1.1204*** 0.1933      0.0386  -9.2092 5.4224***    0.1874*** -2.0945*** 0.2923    0.0476 
  (0.2867)  (0.3483)     (0.0683)  . (0.4997)   (0.0732)  (0.3648)  (0.4169)   (0.0659) 
Observations  3630 3630 3630 
Log-likelihood -1368.2179  -279.0119  -1190.8221 
Pseudo-R2  0.1088   0.2360   0.1635 Table 13: Time Costs of Administering Financial Services Survey (In Minutes) 
  Questionnaire type 
Total 
 1  2  3 
Banked        
 No  41.52 32.15  35.92  36.50 
  (22.26) (14.21)  (15.61) (18.08) 
  [468] [475]  [479] [1,422] 
 Yes  52.75 36.09  42.76  44.32 
  (34.89) (15.97)  (20.50) (26.45) 
  [187] [158]  [178]  [523] 
Formal credit        
 No  44.12 33.15  37.50  38.23 
  (26.30) (14.79)  (17.27) (20.51) 
  [613] [621]  [634] [1,868] 
 Yes  53.50 32.08  45.22  47.69 
  (34.20) (13.51)  (17.68) (28.41) 
  [42] [12]  [23]  [77] 
Insurance        
 No  41.23 32.95  37.02  36.85 
  (22.46) (14.74)  (17.48) (18.57) 
  [495] [582]  [579] [1,656] 
 Yes  55.55 35.18  43.32  48.65 
  (35.51) (14.99)  (15.09) (29.37) 
  [160] [51] [78]  [289] 
Total  44.73 33.13  37.77  38.60 
  (26.94) (14.76)  (17.32) (20.95) 
  [655] [633]  [657] [1,945] 
Notes:   Means, standard errors (in brackets) and number of observations (in square brackets).   52
Appendix A 
Construction of Indicators from Product-Level Questions 
 
Banked: Q2 ATM card 
    Q4 Debit Card 
    Q6 Savings Plus Account 
    Q8 Current Account 
    Q10 Savings Account at Bank 
    Q12 PostBank Account, Post office savings account 
    Q36 Bank Loan 
    Q54 Bank Overdraft Facility 
 
Indirect: Q16 Use of someone else’s account 
 
Formal Savings: Q6 Savings plus account 
       Q10 Savings Account at bank 
       Q12 PostBank Account, Post office savings account 
       Q14 CDs, treasury bills, notes, money market funds 
       Q22 Savings w/ regulated MFI 
       Q24 Savings w/ credit union 
       Q30 Shares, Investment funds 
       Q32 Provident fund 
       Q34 Pensions fund 
 
Informal Savings: Q26 Susu scheme 
      Q28 Welfare scheme, other savings club (e.g., with religious         
organization). 
 
Formal Credit: Q36 Bank loan 
          Q38 Loan from government 
      Q40 Loan from credit union 
          Q42 Loan from MFI 
          Q44 Loan from employer 
 
Informal Credit: Q46 Loan from moneylender 
        Q48 Welfare scheme, susu, savings club 
        Q50 Loan from friend, family member 
 
Insurance: Q60 Vehicle 
        Q62 Property 
            Q64 Homeowners 
        Q66 Debts 
        Q68 Travel 
        Q70 Life 
        Q72 Debts if you die 
        Q74 Disability from employer   53
        Q76 Other disability 
        Q78 Professional 
        Q80 Funeral policy w/ institution 
        Q84 Health/Medical 
        Q86 Children’s education 
 
 
   54
Table (Appendix B):  
  Banked  Indirect access 
to account
Formal non-bank 
savings Informal savings  Formal credit  Informal credit  Insurance 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Panel A: Region fixed effects (10 regions) 
Informant = Head of HH  0.0119  0.0102  0.0035  0.0232  0.0103  -0.0014  0.0300* 
   (0.0221)  (0.0129)  (0.0091)  (0.0222) (0.0086)  (0.0117)  (0.0170) 
Informant = Random Non-Head  -0.1605***  -0.0138  -0.0072  0.0113  -0.0044  -0.0036  0.0294 
   (0.0244)  (0.0143)  (0.0101)  (0.0246) (0.0095)  (0.0130)  (0.0189) 
Observations 1734  1734  1734  1734  1734  1734  1734 
Adjusted R2  0.1865  0.0225  0.0235  0.0532  0.0316  0.0236  0.0731 
Test of Informant Head = 
Random              
 F-statistic  43.8081  1.9167  0.5130  0.2188  2.9051  0.0349  0.0076 
 Associated  p-value  [0.0000]  [0.1664]  [0.4740]  [0.6400]  [0.0885]  [0.8518]  [0.9303] 
Panel B: Enumeration area fixed effects (154 enumeration areas) 
Informant = Head of HH  0.0204  0.0110  0.0024  0.0211  0.0129  -0.0061  0.0299* 
   (0.0220)  (0.0128)  (0.0091)  (0.0219) (0.0088)  (0.0117)  (0.0165) 
Informant = Random Non-Head  -0.1569***  -0.0104  -0.0055  0.0086  -0.0052  -0.0035  0.0282 
   (0.0243)  (0.0141)  (0.0100)  (0.0241) (0.0097)  (0.0129)  (0.0181) 
Observations 1734  1734  1734  1734  1734  1734  1734 
Adjusted R2  0.2274  0.0873  0.0619  0.1260  0.0457  0.0756  0.1767 
Test of Informant Head = 
Random             
 F-statistic  43.8081  1.9167  0.5130  0.2188  2.9051  0.0349  0.0076 
 Associated  p-value  [0.0000]  [0.1664]  [0.4740]  [0.6400]  [0.0885]  [0.8518]  [0.9303] 
Notes: Marginal effects reported from linear specifications based on the specifications in Table 4. Linear specifications are used to derive unbiased estimates in 
the presence of fixed effects. Panel A includes 10 region fixed effects and panel B includes 154 enumeration area fixed effects. (* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01).   55
Table (Appendix C):  
  Banked  Formal non-bank 
savings Informal savings  Formal credit  Informal credit  Insurance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Marginal effects from probit regressions 
Product  0.0250  -0.0252 0.1453**  0.0940*** 0.0051 0.2855*** 
    (0.0262) (0.0349) (0.0500) (0.0207) (0.0070) (0.0506) 
Travel  time  -0.0001 -0.0004** -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0000  -0.0016** 
    (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0008) 
Observations 401 401 401 401 401 401 
Pseudo-R2  0.1290 0.0743 0.0906 0.1745 0.2096 0.1509 
Panel B: Region fixed effects (10 regions) 
Product  0.0152  0.0090 0.1004***  0.0226*** -0.0024 0.1346*** 
    (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0107) 
Observations  3630 3630 3630 3630 3630 3630 
Adjusted  R2  0.3639 0.3369 0.1052 0.0549 0.0148 0.1452 
Panel C: Enumeration area fixed effects (154 enumeration areas) 
Product  0.0205**  0.0152 0.0993***  0.0234*** -0.0031 0.1374*** 
    (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0102) 
Observations  3630 3630 3630 3630 3630 3630 
Adjusted  R2  0.3973 0.3672 0.1410 0.0857 0.0482 0.2418 
Notes: Panel A reports marginal effects from probit specifications similar to the specifications in Table 6 with the additional variable “Travel 
time.” Panels B and C report marginal effects from linear specifications similar to the ones in Panel A excluding the variable “Travel time.” 
Linear specifications are used to derive unbiased estimates in the presence of fixed effects. Panel B includes 10 region fixed effects and panel C 
includes 154 enumeration area fixed effects. (* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
 
 